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GENDER AND JUDGING 
THE HONORABLE DIANE S. SYKES 
On Monday, October 4, 2010, Elena Kagan heard her first case as 
the 112th Justice of the United States Supreme Court, replacing Justice 
John Paul Stevens, who retired in June after an extraordinary thirty-
four-year tenure on the Court.  It was often noted when she was 
nominated, and was emphasized again when she took the bench, that 
Justice Kagan is the fourth woman to serve on the Supreme Court, and 
for the first time in the Court’s history, three women are now serving 
together. 
In that sense Elena Kagan and I have a little something in common.  
I was the fourth woman to serve on the Wisconsin Supreme Court—and 
one of three during most of my tenure there because Justice Janine 
Geske (who was the court’s second female justice) left the court the year 
before my appointment in 1999.  Justice Patience Roggensack was later 
elected in 2003, and together with Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson 
and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, we became the first-ever female 
majority on the court.  After I was confirmed to the Seventh Circuit in 
2004, Judge Barbara Crabb, the first woman to serve as a federal district 
judge in Wisconsin, sent me a wonderful note; among other things, it 
said: “Congratulations on becoming the fourth woman and second 
Diane on the Seventh Circuit!”  (There’s that Number Four again.)  The 
other “Diane” of course is Judge Diane Wood, who was right up there 
with Solicitor General Kagan among the top contenders to replace 
Justice Stevens. 
Both Judge Wood and Solicitor General Kagan had been high on 
President Obama’s Supreme Court “short list” in 2009, when Justice 
Souter announced his retirement from the Court.  Shortly before that 
announcement, Dahlia Lithwick, the popular legal columnist for the 
online magazine Slate, had this to say about the much-anticipated 
Supreme Court vacancies that President Obama would have the 
opportunity to fill: 
 
  Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.   This is a 
revised version of a speech delivered at several lawyer and law-student events in 2010 and 
2011, including the Association for Women Lawyers’ annual Women Judges’ Night in 
Milwaukee. 
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It’s almost an article of faith among Supreme Court 
watchers that President Obama will fill the bench’s next 
vacancy—and perhaps the one after that, too—with a 
woman.  The current court’s sole female member, Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, has said she is “lonely” there, and even 
if she’s not the next to step aside and another [woman] 
joins her, that’s still just two out of nine.  Americans 
seem quite certain that isn’t enough.1 
 
Lithwick was not alone in this prediction, and we now know it 
turned out to be right: With Justice Sonia Sotomayor replacing Justice 
Souter last year and Justice Kagan replacing Justice Stevens this year, 
President Obama has indeed used his first two appointments to the 
Court to boost its female membership.  After the Kagan confirmation 
vote this past summer, David Broder of The Washington Post wrote a 
column suggesting that “[w]ith another woman, the Supreme Court 
can’t help but change”; he predicted that having three women justices 
“will change the high court in ways that no one foresees.”2  After Justice 
Kagan was sworn in, there was a change: The Court altered its oral 
argument calendar for the first Monday in October; the schedule was 
adjusted to make sure that Justice Kagan would be on the bench when 
the new term began.  First up on the First Monday was a federal 
sentencing case, but the former Solicitor General was necessarily 
recused.  The Court switched the order of the day’s call so that a 
bankruptcy case led off instead.  This permitted Justice Kagan to make 
her high-court debut when the Court officially opened its new term.  
Tony Mauro, the Supreme Court reporter for the Legal Times, saw 
some gender significance in this move.  In an anticipatory column, he 
reminded us that “[t]he first day of the fall term . . . will be historic 
because for the first time in history, and because of Kagan’s arrival, 
three of the nine justices who emerge from behind the velvet curtains at 
the start of the session will be women.”3  This “is a moment that could 
have been destroyed,” he said, “or made awkward” by Kagan’s recusal 
 
1. Dahlia Lithwick, The Fairer Sex: What Do We Mean When We Say We Need More 
Female Justices?, SLATE, Apr. 11, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2215833. 
2. David S. Broder, Op-Ed., With Another Woman, the Supreme Court Can’t Help But 
Change, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/07/21/AR2010072104065.html.  
3. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Rearranges Schedule with Kagan in Mind, BLT: THE 
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 9, 2010, 11:16 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/08/ 
supreme-court-rearranges-schedule-with-kagan-in-mind.html. 
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from the first case.4  The schedule was changed, he suggested, so that 
“[t]he historic moment will be preserved.”5  Apparently it didn’t occur 
to him that the Court would extend this sort of first-case courtesy to any 
newly arrived justice, regardless of gender. 
All this focus on the fact that our newest justices are women raises 
some important questions about gender and judging.  I’ve always been a 
little uncomfortable with the implications and consequences of gender-
identity politics—or any identity politics, for that matter—and 
particularly so in matters of judicial selection.  But mine may not be the 
prevailing view.  Dahlia Lithwick noted in her column that “with women 
claiming a large share of responsibility for Obama’s victory over John 
McCain, the demand for a more gender-balanced [supreme] court is 
stronger than ever.”6  She suggested as well that there might be 
“something about the way [that women] decide cases . . . that makes the 
need for more of them . . . urgent,” and went so far as to say that 
President “Obama owe[s] us another woman justice.”7 
I suppose there’s a purely political explanation for the conventional 
wisdom that the recent vacancies on the Supreme Court would be filled 
by women.  But I’m less interested in the symbolic aspects of this issue 
than the substantive—the extent to which gender does, or should, make 
any difference in judging.  If the case is being made for the appointment 
of women judges just because they are women, then I think we are 
making a mistake about the qualities necessary in a good judge, which of 
course are not gender-specific.  If the case is being made for the 
appointment of women judges because they subscribe to a gender-based 
brand of judging, then we are making an even bigger mistake about the 
nature of the judicial role.  To assign gender a kind of qualifying 
significance risks diminishing the contributions of women judges by 
emphasizing their gender as if it has something to do with their 
qualifications for judicial office or has substantive significance in their 
work. 
During my five-year tenure at the state supreme court, there were 
only three cases that divided the court along gender lines.  The first two 
were State v. Huebner8 and State v. Franklin,9 which raised related issues 
 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Lithwick, supra note 1. 
7. Id. 
8. 2000 WI 59, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727. 
9. 2001 WI 104, 245 Wis. 2d 582, 629 N.W.2d 289. 
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regarding the use of a six-person jury in misdemeanor cases.  The court 
had recently held that the statute authorizing a jury of six in 
misdemeanor cases was unconstitutional; the issue in Huebner was 
whether a defendant who had not objected to the six-person jury at trial 
could obtain relief on appeal, and Franklin raised the question of 
whether a defense attorney’s failure to object was ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  The court held in Huebner that the failure to object was a 
forfeiture that the court would not remedy.10  In Franklin the court held 
that counsel’s failure to object was not ineffective assistance of counsel.11  
I joined Chief Justice Abrahamson’s dissent in both cases, as did Justice 
Bradley.12  The Chief Justice and Justice Bradley, I should note, 
anchored the court’s liberal wing.  In split decisions we did not usually 
vote together.  On these cases the gender split among the justices went 
unnoticed. 
The same cannot be said of the third case.  State v. Oakley13 was a 
case about a deadbeat dad who was hopelessly and criminally in arrears 
on his child support.  David Oakley had fathered nine children by four 
women and owed more than $25,000 in back child support.  He was 
charged with nine counts of felony intentional nonsupport and pleaded 
guilty to three of them, facing a possible fifteen years in prison.  The 
trial-court judge imposed a short prison term followed by lengthy 
probation, and as a condition of probation, barred Oakley from having 
any more children unless he could demonstrate to the court that he was 
supporting those he already had and had the financial ability to support 
another.  The judge imposed and stayed a sentence of eight years, so a 
violation of the no-procreation condition would mean eight years in 
prison.  As will be obvious by now, Oakley challenged the 
constitutionality of the ban on procreation, and his case deeply divided 
our court. 
In a majority opinion by Justice Jon Wilcox, the court concluded that 
the no-procreation probation condition was constitutional.14  Justice 
Bradley and I separately dissented, and Chief Justice Abrahamson 
joined us.15  Justices William Bablitch and N. Patrick Crooks each wrote 
 
10. 2000 WI 59, ¶ 26, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727. 
11. 2001 WI 104, ¶ 27, 245 Wis. 2d 582, 629 N.W.2d 289. 
12. 2000 WI 59, ¶ 86, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); 
2001 WI 104, ¶ 80, 245 Wis. 2d 582, 629 N.W.2d 289 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
13. 2001 WI 103, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 629 N.W.2d 200. 
14. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. 
15. Id. ¶¶ 40–64 (Bradley, J., dissenting); id. ¶¶ 65–76 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
16. SYKES-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2011  8:22 PM 
2011] GENDER AND JUDGING 1385 
concurrences responding to different points in the dissents.16  The issue 
was novel, so we were in uncharted legal territory and the case was 
difficult for the court.  It was agreed that the no-procreation condition 
implicated a fundamental right; we also agreed on the severity of the 
crime and the strength of the state’s interest in protecting women and 
children from the harsh consequences of chronic deadbeat dads like 
David Oakley.  We disagreed over whether the no-more-children 
condition was an overbroad encumbrance on the procreation right in 
light of the conditional nature of the defendant’s liberty interest.  There 
was a lot of back-and-forth in the opinions about how to characterize 
the no-procreation condition and how the constitutional inquiry should 
be framed.  For the all-male majority, it was the defendant’s intentional 
and ongoing disregard of the rights of his children and their mothers 
that mattered most.  For the all-female minority, banning the birth of a 
child was an unconstitutionally overbroad response to the problem. 
Now, as you might imagine, the court’s decision in State v. Oakley 
made some news—in the conventional media and beyond.  The case was 
tailor-made for talk radio and television and was picked up by local and 
national talk shows.  This is where the court’s gender split was noticed.  
A few days after the court’s decision in Oakley was released, I was at 
home in the evening folding laundry in my kitchen.  The television was 
on in the background, tuned to the Fox News Channel.  (Surprise!  You 
were expecting maybe MSNBC?)  I was only half paying attention, but I 
heard Bill O’Reilly’s voice saying: “Coming up on the Factor, the case of 
a Wisconsin deadbeat dad with nine kids ordered not to have any more 
children!”  So I started to pay attention, and after the commercial break, 
Bill O’Reilly came back on and introduced the story this way: He put 
photos of the three dissenting justices up on the screen—the Chief, 
Justice Bradley, and me—and alongside our photos was David Oakley’s 
mug shot.  Now, David Oakley was kind of a creepy-looking guy, so I 
could sense where this was going.  With these photos on the screen, Bill 
O’Reilly said: “Why do these women want this man to have more 
children?” 
Well, of course that’s not what we had said, but there it was, on 
national television, on a show watched by millions of people.  This was 
not going to be a problem for Shirley and Ann, of course, because they 
don’t know anyone who watches the Fox News Channel.  But I know a 
lot of people who watch the Fox News Channel, and as Bill O’Reilly 
continued to discuss the David Oakley case, my phone started ringing, 
 
16. Id. ¶¶ 25–35 (Bablitch, J., concurring); id. ¶¶ 36–39 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
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and I spent the rest of the evening explaining to family members what 
the case was really about. 
Our court returned to the Oakley case in a different forum a couple 
of years later.  Every year our state supreme court goes on the road and 
hears a day or two of oral arguments in one of Wisconsin’s seventy-two 
counties.  The court’s traveling sessions are always accompanied by a 
visit with the local bar association and area civic and school groups.  A 
year or two after the Oakley case was decided, we heard arguments in 
Portage County and during a break went to visit with the students at the 
Stevens Point Area High School. 
We were all seated at a long table on the stage in the high-school 
auditorium, and there were thousands of students present—Stevens 
Point is the largest high school in the state—and after an introduction 
and initial presentation about the court by the Chief, we took turns 
answering questions from the students.  When it was my turn, a student 
asked what was the most interesting case the court had recently decided.  
I explained that many (though not all) of our cases were interesting 
because we only accepted cases that had statewide importance, but that 
even so, most of the time our decisions did not get a lot of attention 
outside the legal profession.  I was buying a little time trying to think of 
a case that would be sufficiently interesting and explainable to the 
students.  I decided to go with the Oakley case. 
I gave a brief description of the facts and the issue in Oakley and 
then explained our split decision.  I told the students that the case was 
novel and difficult and had attracted quite a bit of attention—including 
commentary on the fact that the court had divided along gender lines, 
with the male justices in the majority and the female justices in the 
minority.  But, I hastened to add, the issue in the case really had nothing 
to do with gender—at which point the Chief leaned into her microphone 
and said: “But it had everything to do with sex!”  This had the effect you 
might expect on the assembled students and ended my serious 
discussion of the court’s interesting caseload. 
Now, Huebner and Franklin—the six-person jury cases—obviously 
had no gender-salient issues (assuming there is such a thing), and in 
truth Oakley didn’t either.  I suppose you could view the Oakley case as 
a clash between the interests of single mothers and their children and 
the rights of support-delinquent fathers, and in that sense our dissenting 
votes were counter-gender-intuitive.  But the case was really about the 
limits of state power, which is a legal question; and I think the way that 
judges approach legal issues cannot be gender-stereotyped. 
This brings me back to my broader point.  Last year, when Second 
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Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor was nominated to replace Justice Souter 
on the Supreme Court, her now-famous “Wise Latina” comment 
sparked an enormous controversy and a public debate over the role of 
gender, race, and ethnicity in judging.  In a speech titled “A Latina 
Judge’s Voice” delivered at the University of California–Berkeley 
School of Law and later published in the La Raza Law Journal, then-
Judge Sotomayor had discussed her views on whether gender and 
national origin “may and will make a difference in . . . judging.”17  She 
noted Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s view that “a wise old man and [a] 
wise old woman will reach the same conclusion in deciding cases,” and 
said she was “not so sure” she agreed with it.18  Then came the words 
that were to go viral during the confirmation process; she said: “I would 
hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences 
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male 
who hasn’t lived that life.”19 
Justice Sotomayor retreated from this view during her confirmation 
hearings, calling her statement “a rhetorical flourish that fell flat,”20 and 
also saying that “[t]he context of the words that I spoke have created a 
misunderstanding.”21  She added emphatically: 
 
[T]o give everyone assurances, I want to state up front 
unequivocally and without doubt, I do not believe that 
any ethnic, racial, or gender group has an advantage in 
sound judging.  I do believe that every person has an 
equal opportunity to be a good and wise judge, 
regardless of their background or life experiences.22 
 
Justice Sotomayor also distanced herself from the “empathy 
standard” President Obama has articulated for judicial decisionmaking.  
I’m referring to the President’s view that while 95% of the cases that 
come before a court can be resolved by a straightforward application of 
the traditional interpretive tools of text, precedent, and rules of 
 
17. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 73 (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&docid=f:56940.pdf (statement of Sonia 
Sotomayor, then-nominee for the United States Supreme Court). 
21. Id. at 66. 
22. Id. 
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construction, the remaining 5% are truly difficult and can “only be 
determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s core concerns, 
one’s broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and 
breadth of one’s empathy.”23  “[I]n those difficult cases,” the President 
has said, “the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge’s 
heart.”24  At her confirmation hearings, Justice Sotomayor disagreed.  
She said: “I . . . wouldn’t approach the issue of judging in the way the 
President does. . . .  I can only explain what I think judges should do, 
which is judges can’t rely on what’s in their heart. . . .  [I]t’s not the heart 
that compels conclusions in cases.  It’s the law.”25 
I think this statement is manifestly true, and to the extent that the 
President’s standard for deciding hard cases is meant to suggest that a 
judge’s empathy should determine the substantive content of the law, 
Justice Sotomayor was right to disagree.  Empathy is a virtue, and it is 
also a desirable quality in a judge, who of course must interpret and 
apply the law in the context of real-life cases.  We cannot properly 
decide our cases without acquiring some insight into the contextual 
realities of each party’s situation, and a judge’s knowledge of the human 
condition and capacity to identify with others is important to that 
endeavor.26  The imperative of judicial impartiality does not require 
judicial indifference to the real people who come before the court; it 
requires evenhandedness and lack of prejudgment.27  As a judicial 
virtue, empathy enables the judge to achieve a better understanding of 
the parties’ circumstances without being predisposed toward one side or 
the other.28 
To return to the question of gender and judging, it goes without 
saying that judges do not shed their life experiences when they put on 
the robe.  But their assigned role in our system is to decide cases based 
on factors external to themselves: the legally salient facts of the case and 
the most faithful reading of the constitution and laws, applicable 
precedent, and accepted principles of legal interpretation.  Justice 
Sotomayor said something to this effect later in her La Raza speech that 
she might have emphasized more in her hearings.  She said: “I am 
 
23. 151 CONG. REC. 21,032 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama).  
24. Id. 
25. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, supra note 20, at 
120 (statement of Sonia Sotomayor, then-nominee for the United States Supreme Court). 
26. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Commentary on Jeffrey M. Shaman’s The Impartial 
Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 639–42 (1996). 
27. See Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 81–82 (2006). 
28. Id. 
16. SYKES-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2011  8:22 PM 
2011] GENDER AND JUDGING 1389 
reminded each day that I render decisions that affect people concretely 
and that I owe them constant and complete vigilance in checking my 
assumptions, presumptions and perspectives . . . .”29 
For her part, Justice Kagan has done nothing to signal that she 
considers her gender to have any particular significance in her work or 
her approach to the law.  As The New Republic pointed out in a column 
last summer, although she has some notable “firsts” on her résumé—the 
first female dean of Harvard Law School and the first woman to serve as 
Solicitor General—she “has not taken up the helm as a leader on 
women’s issues, or explicitly identified herself as a woman leader in the 
law.”30  When asked by an interviewer whether she was treated any 
differently as a female law-school dean, she said that her gender is “‘not 
something I think about on a daily basis, and it’s something that in many 
ways has seemed remarkably not relevant in the job.’”31 
And at her confirmation hearings last summer, she too disagreed 
with the President’s empathy standard.  By then it had been slightly 
reformulated, as Senator Kyl noted in his questions to the nominee.  He 
quoted the statement the President made when Justice Stevens 
announced his retirement; the President said he would look for a 
replacement who had “a keen understanding of how the law affects the 
daily lives of the American people” and who “knows that in a 
democracy, powerful interests must not be allowed to drown out the 
voices of ordinary citizens.”32  Senator Kyl asked then-Solicitor General 
Kagan whether she agreed that “judges should take into account 
whether a particular party is a big guy or a little guy when approaching a 
question of law . . . [o]r [consider] that one side is powerful or . . . is a 
corporation.”33  Then-Solicitor General Kagan said this in response: 
 
 
29. Sotomayor, supra note 17, at 93. 
30. Naomi Schoenbaum, Post-Gender Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 2010, 
http://www.tnr.com/print/article/politics/76176/post-gender-justice. 
31. Id. 
32. Remarks on the Explosion at the Upper Big Branch Mine in Montcoal, West 
Virginia, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 244 (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000244/pdf/DCPD-201000244.pdf (recording remarks by President 
Obama on the Retirement of Justice Stevens). 
33. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Elena Kagan, to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. (2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/ 
KAGANHEARINGSDAY2.pdf (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
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I think that courts have to be level playing fields and 
everybody has to have an opportunity to go before the 
court, to state his case, and to get equal justice.  And one 
of the glorious things about courts is that they do provide 
that level playing field in all circumstances, in all cases.34 
 
Senator Kyl also questioned Kagan about the original version of the 
empathy standard.  He asked: “[D]o you agree with [the President] that 
law only takes you the first 25 miles of the marathon and that the last 
mile has to be decided by what’s in the judge’s heart[?]”35  “Senator 
Kyl,” she responded, “I think it’s law all the way down.”36 
Of course judges have life experiences and philosophical views that 
affect their understanding of the cases they must decide, and some of 
these may be linked to gender, race, or ethnicity.  Good judges will 
constantly check for these influences and deal with them judiciously, 
consistent with the obligations of the judicial oath of office.  The 
qualities necessary in a good judge are intelligence, personal integrity, 
impartiality, practical wisdom, and moderation.37  These are not group-
identity character traits, they are individual-identity character traits. 
Whatever else Justice Kagan’s presence on the Supreme Court 
might mean for our law, I hope it helps us move beyond gender-identity 
politics.  The New Republic article suggested that Elena Kagan might 
turn out to be the “Post-Gender Justice.”  As a judge who happens to be 
a woman, I certainly hope so. 
 
 
34. Id. (statement of Elena Kagan, then-nominee for the United States Supreme Court).  
35. Id. (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary ). 
36. Id. (statement of Elena Kagan, then-nominee for the United States Supreme Court). 
37. See generally Solum, supra note 27, at 76–85 (explaining a theory of judicial virtue 
derived from the classical virtues). 
